The Principle of Non-Sensuous Awareness in Jaina Philosophy
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7673459Keywords:
sāṁvyavahārika, nirjarā, saṁvara, rāga, Āśrava, Mokşa, anantajñāna, anantadarśana, anantavīrya, jñānāvaraṇīyakarma, matijñānāvaraṇīya, śrutajñānāvaraṇīya, avadhijñānāvaraṇīya, manaḥparyāyajñānāvaraṇīya, pudgalas, Paramātmā, pariņāminitya, kūṭasthanitya, mukhya pratyakșaAbstract
Indian philosophers have been too much preoccupied with their theories of inference. As a result, theories of perception and linguistic meaning have suffered from comparative neglect. Besides, though much is known about the theories of perception of the Buddhists, the Naiyāyikas, the Sāmkhyas, very little is known about their criticism by the Jainas, Furthermore, the works that have appeared so far on the subject are mainly concerned with psychology and not epistemology. In this respect the present work that fills up the lacunae is the most welcome addition to the literature on Indian philosophy. The paper discusses the Jaina theory of the concept of non-sensuous perception in philosophy also the paper concludes with the analysis of the Āgamika concept of perception and its classification into mukhya and sāmvyavaharika knowledge.
